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Mailing It In:
European Union Efforts at Pension Reform
Michael K. Stransky*
Occupational pension schemes are one pillar of the European pension system;
the other pillars are public schemes and individual pension plans. Authoritative
sources have noted that the dearth of specific European Union ("EU") rules regarding
occupational pension schemes and the stringent requirements upon them, such as
workers losing their pension rights should they move between countries, have certain
negative consequences, such as impairing labor mobility. On October 11, 2000, the
EU issued a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
activities of institutions for occupational retirement provision ("Directive").' The catalyst to
this Directive was to assist the efforts of occupational fund schemes in relieving the
impending financial pressures on the Member States' public systems. The Directive is
to address various challenges to the overall pension system by strengthening one of its
pillars, the occupational pension scheme.
The most prevalent challenge to the European (as well as the US) pension
system is the prospect of an aging population, represented demographically by the
retirement of the "baby boomer" generation vrith a corresponding low fertility rate
today. In fact, the European Commission has noted that "[p]opulation ageing [sic]
will be on such a scale that, in the absence of appropriate reforms, it risks undermining
the European social model as well as economic growth and stability in the European
* JD candidate 2002, University of Chicago; BSFS 1996. Georgetomn University.
1. COM (00) 507 final (Oct 11, 2000) available online at <htrp:Ileuropaeu.inrlcommlintemnal
market/en/flnances/pensions/com5O7en.pdf> (visited Mar 25, 2001). When thc Commission
makes proposals such as this, it often attaches an explanatory memorandum to its propoal. This
memorandum is also available in this citation. The Commissions vie,, on 'the abs=cnc of a
Community framework and the negative consequences of this gap" can be found in this
memorandum. See Explanatory Memorandum, para 1.1(b). See also Philip Shishkin, Cross.B-rder
Investing is Nearer for Europes Big Pension Funds, Wall St J A24 (June 19, 2000) (quoting EU
Commissioner for the Internal Market Fritz Bolkestein that the current pension systems
'undermine[ ] the competitiveness of pan-European companies which have to zet up specific pension
arrangements in all member stares."). For convenience, this proposed directive will bc referred to as
the "Direcive" though it must be formulated into a final directive and national governments and the
European Parliament must approve it before it becomes Union law.
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Union."2 Currently in the EU, four workers support every pensioner; however, that
ratio is expected to drop to two workers by 2025, and even to a one-to-one ratio in
some states at that time These demographic facts lie in the background of the
pension system and any effort to reform it.
In addition to these demographic challenges, Member States have various
national restrictions and statutory provisions detrimental to economic efficiency.' In
some Member States, pension funds are often restricted in their investment decisions
by rigid and uniform quantitative thresholds-for example, a fund can only invest a
certain amount of its assets in domestic stocks, foreign stocks, or government bonds.
Also, pan-European companies cannot centralize their pension investments and
activities in a single fund, but rather are restricted to executing pension funds in
accordance with the pension laws of the individual Member States. Workers moving
from one Member State to another often lose a part or all of their acquired pension
rights when movin& and their cross-border pension contributions do not attract the
same tax advantages as purely domestic contributions. These national restrictions
deter labor mobility, an efficiency recuirement absolutely crucial to the success of the
single market and common currency.
2. Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament and to the
Economic and Social Committee, The Future Evolution of Social Protection from a Long-Term Point of
View:. Safe and Sustainable Pensions, COM (00) 622 final at 2 (Oct 11, 2000), available online at
<hctp://europa.eu.inr/comm/employment-social/soc-prot/social/news/pensionsen.pdf> (visited
Mar 25, 2001). The Commission also wisely notes that an increase in the
demographic old-age dependency ratio can neither be halted by a sudden increase in
fertility nor by any realistic level of immigration. Changes in fertility only start having an
impact on the labour market twenty years later. However, immigration can contribute
towards raising the level of employment-but its positive impact depends on the extent
to which migrants can be sufficiently integrated into the labour market.
Id at 5-6.
3. The Commission has aptly noted that it is actually 'much more relevant for an assessment of the
prospective sustainability of pension systems to consider the actual number of people in employment
in relation to people who do not work." Id at 6.
4. See Fritz Bolkestein, Pension Funds in the European Union, speech given Mar 30, 2000, available online
at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internaLmarker/en/speeches/spchlO9.htm> (visited Mar 25,
2001).
5. On a related issue, the European Court ofjustice recently made a preliminary ruling that Article 52
(now, after amendment, Article 43) of the Treaty on European Union precludes, if certain criteria
are met, a Member State from making a tax exemption subject to the condition that the investment
be held in a company established in the Member State concerned. C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorincbem, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), Case C-251/98,
2000 0 J (C 192) 8, Apr 13, 2000. Essentially, if a tax benefit accrues to a national from an
investment in a wholly domestic company, a Member State may not deny that benefit if the national
makes the same investment in another Member Stare.
6. A common currency is economically viable when the proposed area for its implementation is an
optimum currency area. An optimum currency area by definition is a "group [ J of regions with
economies closely linked... by factor mobility. Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International
Economics: Theory and Policy 629 (Addison 5th ed 2000). Labor is one of the basic factors of
production across the geographic area of Europe, and therefore labor mobility is essential to the
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It is the sole responsibility of the EU Member States to maintain the legal
framework of their respective pension regimes, and thus they have the exdusive power
to address these demographic challenges and statutory inefficiencies. France and
Spain have emphasized adjustments to the parameters of their existing, mandatory
"pay-as-you-go" schemes,7 such as adjustments to the contribution rate, retirement age
or benefit payment level. Sweden has favored accumulation of reserves within the
existing public scheme, while Italy has opted for an increased reliance on private
schemes. The long-term sustainability of pension schemes is most sound in the two
countries with the most open and private systems, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands.! The differing actions taken to meet the challenges to the pension
system clearly exemplify the various governing philosophies of the Member States
with respect to reforms in this area.
The Commission noted its ability to coordinate national regulatory schemes at
the supranational level, and its recent Directive addresses directly some of the outlined
concerns. Though the Directive maintains qualitative restrictions, it proposes that
pension funds be allowed to invest up to 70 percent of their assets in shares, far more
than is allowed in most EU states.9 The Directive is also designed to allow
multinational corporations to create pan-European funds, rather than creating
individual funds in each Member State, thereby allowing fund managers and
custodians across Europe to compete for business." The Commission estimates that
this would save 40 million Euros a year in administrative costs." It is the goal of the
EU to facilitate coordination in this area, namely in Member State efforts to address
challenges to their individual pension systems.
success of the common currency. These hindrances of the European pension system, such as
portability of pension rights and differing tax treatment, only exacerbate the fact that labor vas not
that mobile throughout Europe before the institution of the common currency for various other
reasons, at least not to the levels requisite to label properly Europe as an optimum currency area. See
id at 632 (discussing the lack of labor mobility in Europe); id at 634 ('Europe is nor an optimum
currency area-).
7. The public pillar whereby current laborers provide wealth transfers through the state to pensioners.
8. See Philip Shishkdn, Cross.Border Investing is Nea rerfor Euror c's Big Pensirn Funds, Wall St J A24 June
19, 2000) ('The Dutch pension fund has served as one of the models for the commission's proposals.
Dutch funds are invested around the world, have a large investor participation and good superision
mechanisms. 'The Dutch system is probably the best one' says one commission official).
9. Directive, art 18(6) (cited in note 1). However, the more successful pension regimes, namely the US
and UK, are governed by the standard of'prudence:' rather than some qualitative stipulation. See,
for example, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 USC §§ 1001 et seq, 1104 ('[A]
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan ... with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a lie capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise ofa like character and with like
aims.").
10. Directive, art 19 (cited in note 1).




It is important to note what this Directive does not do. First, it does not address
how Member States organize the pillars of their pension systems. Member States are
free to maintain their public schemes without interference, and can encourage or
discourage private pension systems as they see fit. It is entirely within the realm of the
Member States to address the demographic challenges to their pension systems. This
specific Directive is not the comprehensive effort needed to support and reform the
overall pension system, as it fails to factor in other political and economic dimensions
of pension reform. This failure to recognize outside economic trends is detrimental
in some respects-for instance, the catalyst to this Directive was to facilitate
occupational funds' efforts to benefit fully from the single European capital market
and the Euro. However, the Commission has failed to note that there is little benefit
to be derived from investments in the Euro." Though the EU has made an admirable
initial effort at addressing the challenges to the pension system, its focus on only one
pillar, rather than a more comprehensive effort, may frustrate the realization of any
benefits that could otherwise be derived from these efforts.
This Directive's failure to address the differing tax treatment of pensions may
also prevent any attainment of benefits. 14 Some Member States currently tax
contributions to occupational pension funds, while others tax the withdrawals as
income from a fund comprised of pre-tax contributions. The Commission hopes that
greater use of occupational pension funds will alleviate the burdens on the public
system; but until this tax exigency is resolved, many of the benefits of the other
provisions of the Directive will remain unfulfilled. It is simply confounding to
consider the accounting difficulties that will be encountered by a firm in its attempt to
consolidate funds for pensions from different Member States, some of which have
been taxed already and some which have not. States will most likely be aggressive in
ensuring that reforms in this area will not jeopardize the tax windfall they receive from
these funds. Thus, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for companies to consolidate
their individual pension funds into a pan-European fund until this discrepancy is
resolved.
12. Current popular proposals in the US are conversely similar in that they rely almost exclusively upon
unrealized budget surpluses to sustain social security, rather than structural reforms to the social
security program. A prominent example of this was President Clinton's "save social security first"
plan announced during his 1998 State of the Union address.
13. The idea that the Euro was going to become a strong reserve currency or a challenge to the
dominance of the dollar has clearly nor played out. After its initial offering of one Euro for $ 1.17,
the Euro was trading at $ 0.84 on October 30, 2000.
14. This Directive is the codification of numerous Green Papers and consultancy studies, all of which
noted this situation and failed to make recommendations for it. See, for example, Pragma
Consulting, Rebuilding Pensions 1 (European Commission 1999) available online at
<hrtp://europa.eu.int/comm/internaLmarket/en/fnances/pensions/pensions2.pdf> (visited Mar
25, 2001) (noting that, despite its 102-page length and "its ambitious scope, the report does not
cover taxation").
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This Directive was designed to encourage the use of the single market, but
without a uniform treatment of pension funds, there is in fact no single market to
employ. For example, the fact that Member States currently tax these funds at
different rates illustrates how there are competing markets for pension funds among
which a private economic actor may choose. Where a laborer can receive the most
advantageous tax treatment of his pension may factor into his decision where to sell
his labor;, with this differing tax treatment there is not one single labor marker but in
fact many. The EU repeatedly assures its members that it is not attempting to dictate
a harmonization of economic and social law, but it is difficult to imagine a true single
market existing without uniform laws and policies in areas of such economic
consequence.
Even if the EU is able to address these taxation issues, the Directive faces other
political difficulties before it receives final approval. Though the Directive does not
address public schemes, France somehow sees this Directive as a threat to its state
pension system and has vowed to block its enactment.J5 Private pension companies are
also unhappy with the Directive because it accords much more favorable treatment to
occupational funds than what a 1994 Directive granted private pension companies.
This dissatisfaction comes after numerous compromises were made simply to bring
the Directive to this stage. Various state and private interests may hinder any proposal
to invoke aggressively the private sector in an effort to alleviate the burdens on the
state pension systems.
These developments also illustrate that European countries have conflicting
social models and priorities, and because of that, the EU is still properly labeled an
intergovernmental institution. Some countries, such as France and Sweden,
emphasize an active government in social affairs with the provision of cradle-to-grave
support. Others, such as Britain, favor a less regulated approach. Individual Member
State policy in the area of pensions provides a paradigmatic illustration of this. France
forbids the existence of occupational schemes and relies heavily upon its state pension
system; whereas Britain supports its citizens' use of private retirement planning. The
fact that France would actively seek to prevent other EU Members from coordinating
their occupational pension schemes illustrates the various social priorities among the
EU Member States. There need not be a moral qualification as to which system is
preferable to note the detrimental effects of such conflicts. The very fact that EU
Member States hold such diametrically opposed views on such policies of
consequence can only hamper the uniform progression of the EU. Though the EU
continues to proclaim a goal of moving towards "an ever closer Union," it wll be
difficult for the Member States to move forward together when so many domestic
15. See Geoff ,inestock, EU Commission Pushes Proposals on Pension Funds, Wail StJ Eur 2 (Oct 6,2000)
([When it is put to member governments and the European Parliament, it is likely to face pitched




policies that bear upon economic union remain fully within the domestic control of
Member States. The differing approaches to various issues, of which retirement
security is one, illustrate that the EU remains a collaborative intergovernmental
institution comprised of fifteen different sets of economic and social policies.
In this collaboration, many have noted that the pension system of Europe is in
dire need of far-reaching reform, but Member States have been unwilling to take the
necessary sweeping action to execute it. The EU has failed to note that those countries
whose pension systems are best suited to address the demographic challenges
explained above, namely the United States and United Kingdom, have pension
systems that facilitate individual responsibility for one's own retirement, namely by
allowing people to access and exploit private equity markets."6 Proposals by the British
to create a less regulated EU market, governed by the standard of prudence," did not
make the final Commission Directive. Though the need for extensive reform and
increased utilization of private markets has been widely discussed, there are currently
no specific proposals that address the tax situation.
The decision respecting the tax treatment of occupational pension schemes will
probably forecast the EU's future reliance on the private sector. Whatever the
decision, it must simply be made so that citizens can begin to make private economic
choices in reliance upon it. Perhaps the EU can direct that all occupational pension
contributions made from some date certain in the future be treated as an investment
with pre-tax funds to be taxed as income upon withdrawal, while any contribution
made prior to that date be taxed according to the pre-existing law." Whatever
taxation scheme is selected, it will allow EU citizens to plan for their own retirement
accordingly. Failure to make any decision will continue to hinder EU Member State
utilization of strengthened occupational pension schemes to address demographic
challenges to their overall pension system.
16. See Old Hopes Stirring- Freeing Europe's Pension Funds, Economist 92 (Oct 14, 2000).
Given that they all agree that a demographic "pension time-bomb" is ticking, Europe's
policymakers have done remarkably little to defuse it.... Governments have discouraged
their citizens from investment in private pensions by imposing rules that lower the
returns earned by pension funds, such as limits on how much money they may put into
equities, or into foreign securities of any sort. As a result, European pension-fund
investors have largely missed out on the bull market in shares over the past two decades.
Id.
17. See note 9.
18. For example, before the phase-in date, if the contribution was a post-tax contribution to be
withdrawn without tax, it should be able to be withdrawn without being taxed in the future, even
though the Directive law in the future may call for taxation of occupational pension fund
withdrawals.
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